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ABSTRACT 
Theory of mind and inhibitory control in young children have both been 
hypothesized as the underpinnings of their social functioning. According to the 
theory of mind hypothesis, children's capacity to recognize and represent other's 
emotions, beliefs, and desires constitutes the very foundation of social development. 
The executive dysfunction hypothesis, on the other hand, attributes social 
performance to domain-general executive processes, specifically inhibitory control. 
The two accounts have been typically conceptualized as separate theoretical 
positions; little research has been directed at comparing them. I conducted three 
studies to address the issue. In Study 1，no significant association was observed 
between 4-to-6-year-olds' inhibitory control and theory of mind performance. 
Theory of mind explained withdrawal symptoms over and above inhibitory control, 
which was not a unique predictor itself. Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1 ； 
inhibitory control played no significant role in theory of mind and social 
performance in 5-to-6-year-old children. Theory of mind was shown to be inversely 
related to a range of social deficits; and was positively related to self-control 
behavior. Study 3 replicated the correlation between theory of mind and social 
deficits in a 3-to-4-year-old sample. Children's theory of mind performance was 
negatively associated with withdrawal symptoms. Inhibitory control had limited 
explanatory power for social deficits after controlling for theory of mind. The current 
findings are consistent with the theory of mind hypothesis, suggesting an integral 
role of theory of mind in children's social development, independent of inhibitory 
control. 
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摘要 
在兒童社交發展的硏究中存在着兩種假說：“心理理論假說”視兒童對他人情 
感，信念及欲望之表征和認知能力爲社交發展的基礎。相對地，“執行能力缺 
陷假說”則認爲執行能力，尤其是抑制能力，能更有效地解釋兒童的社交行 
爲。這兩種論說一般都被視爲獨立的理論假設；迄今爲止，較少硏究曾對心理 
理論和執行能力在兒童社交發展的影響作出比較，此硏究擬對此問題作全面系 
統的探討。硏究一的結果顯示,4-6歲兒童的抑制能力跟心理理論沒有顯著關 
係。在控制抑制能力因素後，兒童的退縮/不合群行爲跟他們的心理理論存在 
顯著相關。另一5-6歲兒童的硏究再度證實了抑制能力跟心理理論和社交能力 
沒有顯著的關係;心理理論能力跟數種社交問題及自我控制行爲存有顯著的相 
關。最後,硏究三的結果顯示，3-4歲兒童的心理理論能力跟退縮/不合群行爲 
存有顯著相關。抑制能力能顯著地預測兒童的社交問題，但在心理理論被控制 
後，抑制能力跟社交問題之間的相關則不再顯著。總括而言，硏究結果表明了 
心理理論在兒童社交發展中的重要性。 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Theory of Mind Hypothesis 
There has been a wealth of research concerning children's social experiences 
within their peer system. Underlying these works is the question of whether and how 
children's theory of mind (ToM) abilities may help explain individual differences in 
social behavior (Leslie, 1987; Pemer，1991; Pylyshyn, 1978，Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). "Theory of Mind" refers to the cognitive capacity to impute mental states to 
oneself and others, and to interpret and predict people's behaviors in terms of their 
underlying mental states. It is suggested that such understanding of mind underpins 
essential communicative and social skills, and thus may have profound impacts on 
social experiences in young children (Astington & Jenkins，1995; Baron-Cohen, 
1988; Happe, 1994; Tager-Flusberg, 1999). 
The ability to understand the intricacies of mental representations emerged 
during early and mid childhood. Within the first year, infants acquire the cognitive 
ability to understand others as intentional agents. They developed the capacity of 
joint attention by following the gaze of another agent, and to use gestures 
declaratively to direct the attention of others (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello，1998). 
By age 3, children understand simple causal relations among outcomes, desires, 
emotions and actions in themselves and others. By age 4, children are able to 
appreciate that others having a different perspective could hold a different belief, and 
that people may hold beliefs that are in conflict with reality (Astington, Harris, & 
Olson, 1988; Pemer, 1991; Wellman, 1990). 
A change-in-location task was first introduced by Wimmer and Perner (1983) 
to assess children's conception of such belief understanding. In a classic scenario, 
children were first introduced to two dolls, Sally and Ann. Sally first placed a marble 
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in a basket and left. Whilst Sally was absent Ann moved the marble from the basket 
to another hiding location. Children were then asked where Sally would look for the 
marble when returning to the room. It was found that a majority of typically 
developing children under age 4 failed the task by saying that Sally would look in the 
hiding location for the marble; they could not reconcile the conflict between their 
own knowledge of reality and others'. In contrast, children aged 4 years and older 
correctly predicted that Sally would search in the place where she had left the marble. 
They understood Sally's false belief concerning the location of the object, and that 
she would behave according to that belief. 
This understanding of what is termed "false belief，marks an important social-
cognitive developmental stage in children (Astington, 1993). Indeed, false belief 
understandings are acknowledged as the hallmark of a mature theory of mind (Pemer, 
1991)，and is pivotal in social experiences and acceptance: "if we did not take into 
consideration other people's thoughts and feelings, we would become very unpopular 
indeed, and might even acquire the stigma of social outcast" (Mitchell, 1997, p. 106). 
The notion that theory of mind constitutes a critical factor for social development has 
been formalized as the "Theory of Mind hypothesis." 
The theory of mind hypothesis is well placed to explain the profound social 
impairments in children with autism. While the ability to understand others' mental 
states occurs quite spontaneously in normally developing children, the same is not 
true for autistic individuals. A bulk of research has shown that autistic children have 
specific difficulties with mental states reasoning, and have suggested that these 
difficulties underlie children's social and communication abnormalities (Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & 
Cohen, 1993; Frith, 1989; Pemer, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989). In particular, 
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individuals with autism typically have difficulty with tasks involving false beliefs. 
Such difficulties experienced by a child with autism have been shown to be 
independent of emotional deficit, language delay, or mental deficiency (Baron, 1985， 
1989; Pemer，Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989，Ozonaoff，Pennington & Rogers，1991). 
The Theory of Mind hypothesis, therefore, implies that impaired mind 
conception may underlie children's social and communication abnormalities (Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & 
Cohen, 1993; Frith, 1989; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam，1989). 
Although the Theory of Mind hypothesis appears to offer a parsimonious 
account of social behavior, it is by no means imcontroversial. Relatively few studies 
have examined the relationship between theory of mind understanding and social 
experiences in typically young children. Recent efforts to link theory of mind to 
social competence have so far produced mixed results. On the one hand, there have 
been studies that do provide evidence for the theory of mind hypothesis. For example, 
preschoolers' performance on false belief tasks was positively correlated with their 
joint proposals and explicit role assignments during pretend play sessions (Astington 
& Jenkins，1995). In another study, 4-to-6-year-olds' performance on false belief 
tasks was significantly related to their teachers' ratings of positive social skills and 
overall social competence (Watson et al.，1999). In a similar manner, Slomkowski 
and Dunn (1996) demonstrated that 40-month-olds，false belief understanding 
significantly predicted the length of connected play and pretend play episodes at 47 
months. 
On the other hand, other research has failed to show a direct relationship 
between social competence and theory of mind. By employing the false belief test 
and the Vineland Adaptive Behavioral scales, Happe and Frith (1996) have shown no 
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6-12-year-olds with a conduct disorder failed the false belief tasks. Sutten, Smith and 
Swettenham (1999) examined the association between theory of mind understanding 
and bullying in 7-10-year-olds. It was found that high performance of mind 
understanding was indeed positively correlated to leader-type bullying. Similarly, 
study of peer rejection in 4-to-6-year-olds has also demonstrated that peer-rejected 
children performed similarly to average children in theory of mind tasks, with some 
exceptions of socio-cognitive aggressive bias (Badenes，Estevan & Bacete, 2000). 
Executive Dysfunctions Hypothesis 
Although the mixed findings mentioned provide no knockdown evidence for the 
theory of mind hypothesis, it do provide a great challenge to its application and 
imply a need to examine other potential correlates of social functioning. The fact that 
theory of mind is selectively impaired in autistic children has led some to argue for 
the domain-specificity of social-cognitive mind understanding, as assessed by the 
traditional false belief tasks. In contrast, proponents of the executive dysfunction 
account have argued that domain-general executive functions may be more 
fundamental and may account for children's performance on theory of mind tasks. It 
was further hypothesized that deficits in executive functions may better explain the 
social-communicative impairments in autism (Damasio & Maurer，1978). 
Executive functioning (EF) is an umbrella term for the processes involved in the 
general control of goal-directed behavior, such as planning, coordinating, error 
correction and detection, inhibitory control, attention flexibility, and working 
memory (Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser，1991; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye， 
1997). It is argued that the tasks commonly used to assess children's mind 
understanding (e.g., False Belief task, Deception test and Appearance-Reality tasks) 
are fairly demanding of young children in a number of ways (Call & Tomasdlo, 
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1999). In particular, theory of mind tasks are criticized for containing executive 
function components, in that these tasks do not merely reflect the development of 
understanding the minds of others. 
A "disengagement" hypothesis was put forth by Russell et al. (1991), which 
claimed that it is the inability to disengage from an object that gives rise to failure on 
false belief tasks. Using boxes with windows cut into the front faces, a child watched 
as a piece of chocolate is placed in one of two boxes with windows facing him/her. 
An opponent was seated on the other side of the boxes and was unaware of the 
placement of the chocolate. The child was required to point to one of the boxes to 
direct the opponent as to which one to open. In order to receive the treat, the child 
had to point to the empty box; the opponent received the chocolate if the child 
pointed to the baited box. The child must therefore leam to deceive the opponent in 
order to obtain the reward. It was found that the ability to give correct answers in the 
false belief task developed together with the ability to suppress pointing as to where 
an object is in the window task. The author argued that the common difficulty is due 
to executive function problems of younger children and of children with autism since 
both tasks require inhibiting reference to a salient object or location. 
Hughes and Russell (1993) further subjected the two hypotheses of "theory of 
mind" and "disengagement" against each other. A series of experiments was 
conducted in which the subjects had to point to the empty box to obtain the reward 
with and without the presence of an opponent. Hughes and Russell argued that if the 
theory of mind hypothesis were correct, subjects would perform better if the element 
of deception were removed from the task. Conversely, if the disengagement 
hypothesis is true, removal of the deceptive element should not change the difficulty 
of the task for subjects. It was found that the removal of the opponent did not 
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facilitate the task, thus supporting the disengagement hypothesis rather than the 
theory of mind hypothesis. It appears that children fail the task primarily due to their 
inability to disengage from focus and attention on objects rather than any 
requirement to deceive others. 
A bulk of correlational studies lends further support to the executive 
dysfunction hypothesis. Examinations of typically developing children demonstrated 
that individuals with relatively strong executive abilities perform better on various 
theory of mind tasks than those with weaker executive abilities. The linkage between 
executive control and theory of mind performance was found to be independent of 
age, intelligence, gender, sibling status and symbolic play (Carlson & Moses, 2001; 
Carlson, Moses, 2001; Frye et al., 1995; Hughes, 1998; Hughes et al.，1998; Pemer 
& Lang, 2000; Pemer, Lang, & Kloo，2002). 
Inhibitory Control 
A variety of executive control measures of inhibitory control (Carlson & 
Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses & Hix，1998; Hala et al., 2003; Hughes, 1998; Russell, 
1996), working memory, and planning (Davis & Pratt，1996; Gordon & Olson，1998; 
Keenan et al., 1998) were administered to explore the relationship between theory of 
mind and executive functioning. Among all, the Dimensional Change Card Sort 
(DCCS; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai，1995) task is commonly used to assess children's 
executive functioning. In a standard DCCS task, children were asked to sort cards 
according to one dimension (e.g., shape) in a pre-switch phase; and to sort cards 
according to another dimension (e.g., color) during a post-switch phase. It has been 
shown that children of 3 years were unable to switch to a new set of card sorting 
rules; whereas a majority of children of 4 to 5 years easily mastered the DCCS task. 
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Moreover, children's performance on the DCCS tasks was positively correlated with 
their ToM abilities (Frye et al.，1995; Zelazo et al.，1996.) 
A cognitive complexity and control (CCC) theory was put forth by Frye and 
colleagues (1995). It is suggested that performance on both DCCS tasks and theory 
of mind tasks depend on domain-general executive processes, namely embedded rule 
reasoning ('if X, if Y, then Z，). Between 3 and 5 years children maturation in 
executive processing complexity permits children to employ higher order rules to 
integrate incompatible pairs of rules. This is the age when children easily master the 
theory of mind tasks (Call & Tomasello, 1999; Frye et al., 1995). The authors thus 
argued that mental states concepts are processed by the more primary executive 
functions, rather than by a dedicated system. 
Nevertheless, research literature concerned with the embedded rule reasoning 
speaks against the notion. Three-year-olds' performance on DCCS task was 
improved when they are induced to redescribe the target cards according to the post-
switch dimension (Towse et al., 2000) or when no target cards were used (Pemer & 
Lang, 2002; Towse et al., 2000)，although the structure of embedded rules was still 
present. Children were also able to master a reversal shift task requiring an 
incompatible pair of rules if only one dimension was manipulated (Brooks et al., 
2003; Pemer & Lang，2002). 
An alternative view has considered inhibitory control (IC), rather than 
embedded rule reasoning as the prime candidate for the ToM-EF relationship 
(Carlson & Moses，2001; Carlson, Moses & Hix，1998; Pemer, Stummer & Lang, 
1999). According to this view, 3-year-olds' difficulties in DCCS and ToM tasks may 
be attributed to their inability to inhibit a salient or initial response and switch to an 
alternate response mode. For example, Hughes (1998a) examined the relationships 
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among inhibitory control, working memory, set shifting and false belief. Among all 
executive measures, inhibitory control was found to be a significant and unique 
predictor of preschoolers' false belief abilities. In another study Hughes (1998b) 
demonstrated that inhibitory functioning of preschoolers predicted concurrent as well 
as later theory of mind abilities. Consistent findings were reported by Carlson and 
colleagues (2001;2002) using different measures of working memory and inhibitory 
control. Inhibition was significantly related to children's false belief abilities, after 
the effects of age, gender and intelligence were controlled. The same did not hold for 
working memory measures. Recent research focused on inhibitory control, planning 
and theory of mind has also found that 3-to-4-year-olds' inhibitory control was 
positively related to their theory of mind after partialling out planning, age and 
receptive vocabulary (Carlson, Moses & Claxton，2004). 
Inhibitory manipulations of theory of mind tasks have also been shown to 
affect children's performance in predictable ways. For example, it was reported that 
inducing the inhibitory demands of the theory of mind tasks made the task more 
difficult even for children of 4 years (Leslie and Polizzi，1998). In another study, 
children's performance on the deception task was improved when they were required 
to use a symbolic/artificial means, such as placing a pictorial cue on the empty box 
or using a pointer to indicate the box (Carlson et al, 1998). In a similar manner, Hala 
and Russell (2001) demonstrated that 3-year-olds' performance on deception task 
was facilitated when an artificial response medium was employed as a distancing 
procedure. This procedure is discussed in detail in relation to Study 1. 
Taken together, research suggests a prima facie case for the association 
between executive functions and theory of mind; and that inhibitory control in 
particular may be at the heart of such association. Nevertheless, most research on 
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theory of mind and executive function impairments has focused mainly on the 
relationships between i) theory of mind and social functioning; and ii) executive 
control and theory of mind abilities, little research has been directed at comparing the 
explanatory powers of theory of mind versus that of executive functions in the social 
domain among young children. The present studies sought to examine whether 
domain-general executive processes could better account for variations in social 
competence than theory of mind ability. 
The Present Studies 
The mentioned studies provide knockdown evidence for neither the theory of 
mind hypothesis nor the executive dysfunction hypothesis. It is unlikely these 
approaches should remain as discrete theoretical accounts. An investigation of the 
relationships among these domains is of great significance in the design of effective 
pedagogies for young children with or at risk of social difficulties for several reasons. 
First, much of the research examining the development of mind understanding 
has been driven by a desire to explore its representational roots, and to enhance our 
understanding of its ontogeny. Less research has been directed at answering the 
question of what role mind conception plays in social development. Efforts to 
directly relate theory of mind competence to social functioning have thus far 
produced mixed results. Hence, the first aim of the present studies was to testify the 
theory of mind hypothesis; it sought to investigate whether and how theory of mind 
abilities, as assessed by false belief tests, would predict children's social behaviors. 
Second, in contrast to the theory of mind hypothesis, the executive dysfunction 
hypothesis argues that children's difficulties on false belief tasks are at least in part 
attributable to their domain-general inhibitory deficits; implying that theory of mind 
tests are indeed tapping children's lack of inhibitory capacity, rather then their 
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immature mind conception. Recent research has already shown the association 
between inhibitory functions and theory of mind in children with autism and 
disruptive behavior disorders. The present studies aimed to extend this work by 
examining the relation between inhibitory control and theory of mind in normally 
developing children. To address this question, I manipulated the inhibitory demands 
of the false belief tasks, using procedures developed by Hala and Russell (2000). If 
the difficulties encountered by younger children in false-belief tasks were indeed 
executive in nature, then any procedure that helped them inhibit the prepotent 
response would lead to success in false-belief tasks. 
Third, the consensus reached by most, but not all researchers is that theory of 
mind abilities are related to at least some aspects of social development; and that 
inhibitory control might constitute the more basic processes underlying the relation 
between theory of mind and social development. Fewer researchers have attempted 
to demonstrate a direct effect of inhibitory control on social performance. It seems 
very likely that successful social interactions require one not only to take into 
consideration others' mental states，as Mitchell (1997) has argued, but also to inhibit 
and regulate emotions and behaviors, and respond adaptively to changes in 
environment. Overall inhibitory control may therefore be pivotal to social success. If 
inhibitory control could uniquely explain social competence beyond theory of mind, 
then we may argue directly for a more parsimonious account, in that social 
competencies are explained by the more basic processes; and there seems no a priori 
reason why the notion of theory of mind needs to be evoked. Therefore, the third 
objective of the present studies was to compare the explanatory power of theory of 
mind and inhibitory control to children's social development. If inhibition is pivotal 
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to social success, then it should remain as a significant predicator of social 
performance, on top of theory of mind. 
Finally, much of the empirical work relating theory of mind to the child's social 
functioning has concentrated on autism and clinically referred children with ADHD 
or other pervasive behavioral disorders. Very few studies have focused on children 
with less severe social problems. The present studies not only contributes to 
understanding the mechanisms involved in social development, but also has 
implications for social skills training in preschoolers at risk for, or already exhibiting, 
relatively mild social difficulties. 
Hypotheses 
1. Children's inhibitory control correlates positively with their theory of mind. 
2. Social functioning correlates positively with inhibitory control after 
controlling for theory of mind, if the executive dysfunction hypothesis is an 
accurate account. 
3. Social functioning correlates positively with theory of mind after controlling 
for inhibitory control, if the theory of mind hypothesis is an accurate 
account. 
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CHAPTER II: STUDY 1 
The first objective of Study 1 was to explore the association between theory of 
mind and social functioning. As false belief understanding was argued to the 
milestone of theory of mind development, a hallmark test of false belief, the change-
in-location task (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983) served as the index of children's theory of 
mind competence. To test whether deficits in theory of mind underlie difficulties in 
social interaction, as stipulated by the theory of mind hypothesis, the Withdrawn and 
Aggression Behavior subscales of the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach, 
1991) were employed to target behavioral problems that are especially relevant to 
maladaptive social interaction (Cillessen et al.，1992). Another objective of the study 
was to relate inhibitory control to theory of mind and social functioning. To assess 
inhibitory control, a direct test of Dimensional Change Card Sorting Task (DCCS; 
Frye et al., 1995) was administered. Also, inhibitory demands of the change-in-
location task were manipulated (Hala & Russell，2001) to test for its effect on theory 
of mind performance. Finally, non-verbal intelligence and general language ability, 
as measured by the Raven's Colored Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 
1998) and Reynell Developmental Language Scales (RDLS; Reynell & Huntley, 
1985), served as the control variables in the present study. 
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 168 four-to-six-year-old kindergartners (range = 4;7 to 6;8, M = 5; 
4，SD = 4.4 months, 98 boys and 70 girls) took part in the study. The sample was 
demographically diverse, recruited through 16 kindergartens serving both lower and 
middle class groups in Hong Kong, China. 59% of the sample reported a family 
income below HKD 20,000. Approximately 30 % of the children's fathers were 
employed in the labor/manual sector (e.g., construction, mechanics), 40 % were 
employed in the general sector, and 16 % were employed in the professional sector 
(e.g., education, accounting). 69 % had an educational attainment below tertiary level. 
Children were all native Cantonese speakers. Informed consents and socio-economic 
data were obtained from the parents of participants; each parent was assured that all 
information would be kept anonymous and confidential. No child had been 
previously assessed or diagnosed as having any psychological or physical 
abnormalities as reported by kindergarten teachers. 
Materials 
Four cardboard boxes (two in silver and two in gold) measuring l lx 11 x 
11cm were used in the change-in-location scenarios. For two of the cardboard boxes, 
transparent windows were cut into their front faces and were covered in Perspex. A 
two-sided color card served as an artificial response medium in the low-inhibitory-
demand condition. Four puppets and toys were used to enact change-in-location 
scenarios. 
For the DCCS card sorting task, four sets of cards measuring 8 x 8 cm were 
used. Each set consists of 2 target cards with target pictures and 6 test cards with 
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pictures on different dimensions. In all conditions the target cards were affixed to 
their target box measuring 11x11x11cm. The test cards were to be placed into one 
of these boxes. 
Measures 
Non-Verbal Intelligence 
Subset A of Raven's Colored Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 
1998) was employed to measure individual differences in nonverbal intelligence. 
Children were asked to choose from a possible six patterns to fit into a blank patch 
within a geometric design, yielding a maximum possible score of 12. Past studies 
have reported high internal consistency of the measure, with split-half reliability 
coefficients around .85. 
General Language Ability 
The receptive subscale of Reynell Developmental Language Scales (RDLS; 
Reynell & Huntley, 1985) served as the measure of general language ability. Test 
items included word comprehension, object naming, understanding of locative 
relations and inference. Split-half reliability coefficients between .81 and .89 have 
been reported in past research for children aged 1 to 5 years 6 months; and 
around .75 for children aged 6 to 7 years. The test was adopted and translated into 
Cantonese by the Hong Kong Reynell Committee (1987). The possible total score 
was 67. 
False Belief Understanding 
Following the procedures of Wimmer & Pemer (1983)，children were 
presented a total of eight change-in-location scenarios. For each scenario, two 
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puppets (X and Y) played with an object briefly, then X put the object in a container 
and left. While X was absent, Y retrieved the object and placed it in another 
container. Finally, X returned. For each story, the child was asked two control 
questions ("In what did X put the object in?" and "Where is the object now?") and 
two false belief questions ("Where will X first look for the object when X returns?" 
and “Where does X think the object is in?") 
The change-in-location task was further divided into two experimental 
conditions: a high-inhibitory-demand condition and a low-inhibitory-demand 
condition. 
The high-inhibitory-demand condition was designed to induce the level of 
executive difficulties of the task. Two experimental manipulations were adopted 
from Hala and Russell's 2001 study. First, children were required to point to the 
target boxes in response to each false belief question. The act of pointing in children 
has been shown to be a prepotent response that is particularly difficult to inhibit 
because it emerges early in development (Hala & Russell, 2001). Second, on the 
front faces of the boxes were little windows through which the child could see inside. 
Conceivably more inhibitory effort was required in this condition as children had to 
inhibit the act of pointing to the box where they could actually see where the object 
was located (Russel et al., 1991). 
In the low-inhibitory-demand condition, inhibitory demands of the task were 
reduced as compared to the other condition in two ways. First, opaque boxes were 
employed in the scenarios. Inhibitory demands of such condition were comparably 
lower than the high-inhibitory-demand condition as children were unable to see the 
target object. Second, in a modification from Hala and Russel's procedure, an 
artificial response mode was employed to further reduce the executive nature of the 
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task; children were asked to refer to the target box by showing the experimenter the 
corresponding side of a color-card. For instance, the child would show the silver side 
of the color-card to the experimenter if the child thought X would look first into the 
silver box when X returned. 
The two experimental conditions were administered in counterbalanced 
order. For each change-in-location scenario, the story was repeated to the child if 
he/she failed either of the control questions; testing was discontinued when a child 
failed either of the control questions for three consecutive trials. False belief scores 
ranged from 0-2, yielding a possible score of 0-8 for each condition. Cronbach's 
alpha for the test questions (8 test questions for each condition) comprising the low-
inhibitory-demand condition and high-inhibitory-demand condition were .82 and .90 
respectively. 
Inhibitory Control 
The Dimensional Change Card Sorting Task (DCCS; Frye et al., 1995) served as 
the measure of children's executive functions. In this task, two target cards (e.g., a 
yellow umbrella and a blue fish) and test cards that matched the target cards on 
different dimensions (i.e., yellow fish and blue umbrellas) were presented to the 
child. During the pre-switch phase, children were told to sort six cards according to 
only one dimension (e.g., color). After sorting the cards using these rules for six 
trials, children were then asked to switch and sort the cards according to the 
alternate dimension (i.e., shape) for another six trials. One of the following 
dimensional shift conditions was employed for each child in randomized order: i) a 
color-shape and size-number condition and ii) a color-size and number-shape 
condition. One point was given for each correct post-switch trial, yielding a possible 
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total score of 0-10. Cronbach's alpha for the 10 test questions comprising the 
inhibitory control measure was .43，indicating low internal consistency. 
Social Functioning 
Chinese version of the Social Withdrawal and Aggression subscales of the 
Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach，1991; Achenbach & Rescorla，2000) 
were completed by teachers of participants to assess children's problematic social 
behaviors. The social withdrawal subscale consisted of 10 behavioral descriptions, 
which included items such as "unresponsive to affection". The aggression subscales 
consisted of 25 aggressive behavior descriptions, which included items such as 
"destroys others' things." Teachers were asked to assess children's behavioral 
frequencies using 3-point rating scale ranging from "not true" to "often true". The 
maximum total scores were 20 and 50 for the withdrawal and aggression subscales 
respectively. High reliabilities were reported in past research, with test-retest rs 
being .80 for the Withdrawn subscale and .87 for the Aggressive Behavior subscale. 
In the present study, Cronbach's alphas for the Aggressive Behavior subscale and 
Withdrawn subscale were .94 and .87 respectively, suggesting high internal 
consistencies. 
Procedures 
Children were individually tested in a quiet room in the kindergarten. Testing 
was completed within a 45-minute period, and in a few number of occasions, testing 
was administered on two different periods, about 1 week apart. The tasks were 
administered in randomized order by trained psychology undergraduates. All tasks 
were administered in Cantonese. Children whose first language was not Cantonese or 
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who were uncomfortable during testing were excluded from the study. After testing, 
children were given stickers as souvenirs. 
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Results 
The descriptive statistics of each measure, including the means, standard 
deviations, and ranges of test scores, are presented in Table la. Table lb displays the 
summary of reliability analyses of test measures. Table Ic displays the correlations 
among test measures. 
Table la. Descriptive Statistics (n = 168) 
Max M SD Range 
Individual level 
Non-verbal intelligence 12 3.77 2.14 0-11 
General language ability 67 54.39 6.04 22-64 
Inhibitory control (IC) 
DCCS card sorting 10 8.91 2.29 0-10 
Theory of mind 
Low-IC-change-in-location “ 8 3.99 2.60 0-8 
High-IC-change-in-location" 8 3.85 2.98 0-8 
CBCL problematic behavior 
Aggressive behavior 50 4.60 7.03 0-36 
Withdrawal behavior 20 2.98 3.51 0-14 
Class level 
Class size 36 9.33 8.12 2-36 
‘Low-inhibitory-demand change-in-location 
b High-inhibitory-demand change-in-location 
Table lb. Reliability Analyses of Test Measures (n = 168) 
a 
Inhibitory control (IC) 
DCCS card sorting .43 
Theory of mind 
Change-in-location .93 
Low-IC-change-in-location .82 
Low-IC-change-in-location .90 
CBCL problematic behavior 
Aggressive behavior .94 
Withdrawn behavior .87 
Social behavior 26 
Table Ic. Correlations among Measures (n = 168) 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Age -
2. Gender .10 -
3. Income -.14 .08 -
4. Non-verbal intelligence .11 -.05 .08 -
5. General language ability .20* .00 .15 .37** -
6. Low-IC-change-in-location" .14 -.03 .08 .23** .32** -
7. High-IC-change-in-locationb .09 -.06 .09 .20** .30** .92** -
8. DCCS card sorting .05 -.01 -.10 .21** .28** .14 .13 -
9. Aggressive behavior -.14 -.21** -.11 -.01 .01 -.19* -.18* .01 -
10.Withdrawal behavior -.22** -.24** -.09 -.09 -.05 -.26* -.22* -.04 .50** -
*p<.05 ** p<001 
a Low-inhibitory-demand change-in-location 
b High-inhibitory-demand change-in-location 
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Examining Hypothesis 1: The Relationship between Inhibitory Control and Theory 
of Mind 
The present data provides no support for a relationship between children's 
inhibitory functions and their theory of mind abilities. 
First, as simple correlational analysis has shown, direct measure of inhibitory 
control (the DCCS task) was neither related to low-IC-change-in-location score, r 
(147) = .14,p = .09; nor to high-IC-change-in-location score, r (149) = .13,/? = .11. 
Second, children's performances on theory of mind tasks were not affected by 
inhibitory manipulations. As indicated in Table Ic，performance on low-IC-change-
in location task was strongly correlated with that on high-IC-change-in-location task, 
r (154) = .92，/? <.001. A paired sample t-test further demonstrated performances on 
the two measures were not significantly different,广（153) = 1.26，；？ = .21. 
Although both change-in-location measures were significantly correlated with 
CBCL behavioral scores, no significant difference was found between these 
relationships: 
i) For CBCL aggressive behavior, t (147) = 0.60,;? >.05. 
(Ho： Fxy = Fxz,； where x is CBCL aggressive behavior; y is the low-IC-change-in-location 
score, and z is high-IC-change-in-location score) 
ii) For CBCL withdrawn behavior, t (148) = -\.5\,p >.05. 
(Ho： Fxy = rxz,； where x is CBCL withdrawn behavior; y is the low-IC-change-in-location 
score, and z is high-IC-change-in-location score) 
Hence, for further analysis, a theory of mind (change-in-location) aggregate score 
was created by combining the scores of the two levels of change-in-location tasks. 
Cronbach's alpha for the theory of mind aggregate was .93. 
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Examining hypotheses 2 & 2: Comparing the Explanatory Powers of Theory of Mind 
and Inhibitory Control with respect to Social Functioning 
Preliminary correlational analyses revealed that children's CBCL Withdrawn 
symptoms were significantly correlated with their change-in-location aggregate 
scores, r (148) = -.2A,p < .05，but not with their DCCS card sorting scores, r (152)= 
-.04,/? = .60. Similarly, CBCL aggressive symptoms were significantly related to the 
change-in-location aggregate scores, r (147) = -.20，p < .05, but not with the DCCS 
card sorting scores, r (151) = .01，/? = .94. 
As children's behavioral data were derived from teachers' ratings, Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling (HLM 2) was used to account for the potential clustered structure 
of the data where student-level data were nested within class-level characteristics. 
Analysis was conducted through creating two component levels. 
The Level 1 model captured the relationships between individual-level variables 
and dependent behavioral variables: 
Yij = Poj+Pij..…+ Poi + rij 
where 
Poj is the intercept; 
pij - Boj are the coefficients for each of the student-level variable; 
Fij is the error term. It is assumed to be normally distributed with 
homogeneous variance across classes. 
Individual-level variables were centered around grand means. 
In the Level 2 model class-level characteristics were included to explain 
variations in the student-level means and slopes: 
Intercept: 
Poj = Yoo + uoj 
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Slopes: 
Pij = Yio + uij 
PQj = YQO + UQj 
where 
Yoo is the grand mean behavioral symptoms of all classes; 
uoj is the deviation of the mean behavioral symptoms of class j from the grand 
mean behavioral symptoms when class-level variables were controlled. It is 
assumed to be normally distributed with variance Tau. 
The relationships among theory of mind, inhibitory control and social 
functioning were investigated separately for each CBCL subscale. 
For CBCL Withdrawal symptoms, I first estimated the relationships between 
inhibitory control and withdrawal behavior. 
Level-1 model: 
(CBCL withdrawal behavior) ij 二 Poj + Pij (gender) + P2j (age) + pjj (income) 
+ P4j (non-verbal intelligence) +P5j 
(general language ability) + Pej (inhibitory 
control) + rjj 
Level-2 model: 
Poj = Yoo + Uoj; plj = YlO + Uij； p2j = Y20 + U2j； P3j = Y30 + U3j； p4j = 丫 4 0 + 1% 
P5j = Y50 + U5j； P6j = 760 + U6j 
As indicated in Table 2a, inhibitory control was a significant predictor of 
children's withdrawal behavior when gender, age, family income, non-verbal 
intelligence and general language ability were considered. The average coefficient of 
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inhibitory functions in predicting CBCL withdrawal behavior was -.23, t{\l) = -2.66, 
p < .05, suggesting a negative relation between the two measures. The variance 
component revealed no significant variation between classes for mean inhibitory 
functions, X^ (5) = 2.09, p >.05. 
Next I fitted a model that allowed an estimation of the effects of theory of 
mind abilities on children's withdrawal behavior. 
Level-1 model: 
(CBCL withdrawal behavior) ij = Poj + Pij (gender) + p2j (age) + Psj (income) 
+ P4j (non-verbal intelligence) +P5j (general 
language ability) + p6j (theory of mind) + Fij 
Level-2 model: 
Poj = Yoo + UOj; P l j = YlO + Uij； p2j = 720 + U2j; P3j = Y30 + U3j; p4j = 丫 4 0 + U4j; 
p5j = Y50 + U5j； P6j = Y60 + U6j 
Shown in Table 2b are the estimated fixed and random effects of the model. 
As can be seen, theory of mind abilities was shown to be a significant predictor of 
withdrawal behavior, p = -.10, t{\l) = -4.27,/? < .001. No significant variation was 
obtained between classes for mean theory of mind abilities, X^ (4) = .74,/? >.05. 
Finally, a full model was attempted in which theory of mind abilities and 
inhibitory functions were both added to the model. 
Level-1 model: 
(CBCL withdrawal behavior) ij = Poj + Pij (gender) + Pzj (age) + Psj (income) 
+ P4j (IQ) +P5j (general language ability) + 
p6j (inhibitory control) + p7j (theory of 
mind) + ry 
Level-2 model: 
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Poj = Too + Uoj； Pij = YlO + Uij； P2j = 720 + U2j； p3j = 730 + U3j; P4j 二 丫40 + U4j 
Psj = Y50 + U5j； p6j = Y60 + U6j； Pvj = 770 + U7j 
When entered into the equation with theory of mind abilities, inhibitory 
control did not account for a significant contribution in explaining withdrawal 
behavior, p = .04，/ (17) = .37，p = .72. On top of inhibitory functioning, theory of 
mind contributed significantly to the model, p = -.09，r (17) = -3.94,/? = .001. Again, 
the effect of theory of mind on withdrawal behavior was unaffected by class 
characteristics, X^ (4) = 6.80,/? = 0.15. A summary of estimated fixed and random 
effects of the two models is presented in Table 2c. 
For CBCL Aggressive symptoms, Hierarchical Linear Modeling has shown that 
neither the theory of mind nor the Inhibitory control measures, whether entered 
individually or together, accounted for additional variance in aggressive behavior 
after age, non-verbal intelligence, family income and general language ability were 
controlled. 
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Table 2a. Two-level HLM Model for Withdrawal Behavior 
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t-ratio 
Overall mean (Too) ^ ^ 5.11* 
Gender (Yo,) -1.22 0.50 -2.44* 
Age(Y�2) 0.05 -2.38* 
Family income (Yo3) -0.20 0.09 -2.11* 
�T � 0.42 0.18 0.23 Non-verbal intelligence (704) 
General language ability (Y05) ‘。训 0.05 -0.07 
Inhibitory control - DCCS C/06) “ -2.66* 
Random variance Coefficient SD X^ 
Intercept (uoo) ^ ^ ^ 
Gender (uo,) 1.24 1.24 2.56 
Age (U02) ‘ 0.11 0.11 6.17 
Family income (Uo3) 0.24 0.24 3.56 
Non-verbal intelligence (Uo45) 0.56 0.56 19.15* 
General language ability (Uo5) 0.12 0.12 6.77 
Inhibitory control - DCCS (U06) 0.22 2.71 2.09 
*p<.05 **p<.001 
(CBCL withdrawal behavior) ij = Poj + Pij (gender) + (hj (age) + Psj (family income) + P4j (IQ) +P5j 
(general language ability) + p6j (inhibitory control) + ry 
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Table 2b. Two-level HLM Model for Withdrawal Behavior 
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t-ratio 
Overall mean (Yoo) ^ ^ 5.80** 
Gender (Yo,) -1.30 0.46 -2.81* 
Age(Y�2) -0.10 0.05 -2.02 
Family income (y�3) -。.丨彳 。.丨� 
Non-verbal intelligence (Yo4) 0-07 0.18 0.39 
General language ability (Yo5) 0.04 -0.27 
Theory ofmind-change-in-location (Yo6) -O-IO a-02 -A21** 
Random variance Coefficient SD X^ 
Intercept (uqo) ^ ^ ^ 
Gender (uo,) 0.64 0.80 0.85 
Age (U02) 0.01 0.11 5.55 
Family income (Uo3) 0.09 0.29 4.43 
Non-verbal intelligence (Uo4) 0.29 0.54 16.80* 
General language ability (Uo5) 0.01 0.09 4.35 
Theory of mind - change-in-location (Uo6) 0.00 2.72 0.74 
*p<_05 **p<.001 
(CBCL withdrawal behavior) ij = Poj+ Pij (gender) + p2j (age) + Paj (family income) + P4j (IQ) +P5j 
(general language ability) + Psj (theory of mind) + ry 
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Table 2c. Two-level //LM Model for Withdrawal Behavior 
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t-ratio 
Overall mean (Yoo) ^ ^ 5.59** 
Gender (Yo.) 0.55 -2.77* 
Age(Y�2) -0.10 0.39 -“之 
Family income (Yo3) -0.79 0.05 -0.61 
Non-verbal intelligence (Yo4) 0.11 0.13 0.65 
General language ability (yos) -0.28 0.14 -0.61 
Inhibitory control - DCCS (Yo6) O.O^  0.10 0.37 
. . . . . ,‘ . "，、 -0.09 0.02 -3.94** Theory of mind - change-in-location (yo?) 
Random variance Coefficient SD 
Intercept (uoo) ^ 1.56 1.62 
Gender (uo.) 0.29 0.54 1.11 
Age(Uo2) 0.01 0.11 7.33 
Family income (Uo3) 0.13 0.36 5.50 
Non-verbal intelligence (Uo4) 0.26 0.52 19.22** 
General language ability (Uo5) 0.02 0.12 5.53 
Inhibitory control - DCCS (Uo6) 0.07 0.27 6.80 
Theory of mind - change-in-location (u。?） 0.00 0.02 0.98 
*p<.05 **p<mi 
(CBCL withdrawal behavior) ij = Poj+ Pij (gender) + Pzj (age) + Psj (family income) + P4j (IQ) + � 
(general language ability) + (inhibitory control) + pvj (theory of mind) + rjj 
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Discussion 
The presented study 1 investigated the relations among theory of mind (ToM), 
Inhibitory control (IC)，and social functioning in a sample of typically developing 
kindergarteners. Taken together, the current study provides support for the 
associations between theory of mind ability and social functioning. Nevertheless, it 
fails to replicate past research in demonstrating a link between inhibitory functions 
and theory of mind ability. In addition, inhibitory control has not been shown to 
make any unique contribution in explaining social behavior after theory of mind 
ability was controlled. 
It has long been argued that deficits in theory of mind can account for 
children's social interaction impairments. In the present study, children's false belief 
understandings, an important indicator of theory of mind, were shown to be 
negatively related to their CBCL withdrawn symptoms. My findings lend further 
support for the theory of mind hypothesis that meta-representational false belief 
understanding remained to be significantly associated with social functioning after 
inhibitory control was controlled. These data was consistent with those reported in 
prior research which has linked theory of mind impairments to social deficits in 
children with autism. 
One further question was raised with regard to the relationship between 
theory of mind and social functioning. Accordingly, the employed Child Behavior 
Checklist (CBCL) was designed to address child behavioral problems; this left open 
the possibility that theory of mind ability would also have an obvious bearing on the 
positive domain of social interaction (Astington & Jenkins，1995; Slomkowski & 
Dunn, 1996). Yet it is not clear from the existing data whether theory of mind ability 
is also involved in pro-social interaction. Study 2 was therefore undertaken to 
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address the above issue. In this follow-up study, I sought to provide a further test of 
the relationships between false belief understanding and social functioning. Study 2 
broadens this investigation by using i) the Social Skills Rating Systems for Parents 
(SSRS-P, Gresham & Elliott, 1990) and ii) observational coding of peer interaction. 
The Social Skills Rating Systems consisted of two subscales: a Social Skills subscale 
and a Problem Behaviors subscale. The Social Skills subscale contained four 
dimensions: Cooperation, Assertion, Responsibility, and Self-Control. The Problem 
Behaviors subscale assessed children's Internalizing Problems and Externalizing 
Problems. Observational measures of peer interaction were based on the procedures 
of Gottman and Parkhurt (1980). The modified coding system included four 
subscales of positive peer interactions: Cooperative pretend play, Coordinated play, 
Amity and Pro-social behavior; and five subscales of negative social behavior: 
Conflict, Control and dominance, Withdrawal, Rejected by peers and Bids for 
attention. 
There was no support for the executive dysfunction hypothesis. In contrast to 
past findings regarding theory of mind and inhibitory control, the present study failed 
to link inhibitory control functions to theory of mind performance. In addition, no 
statistically significant relationship was found between direct measures of executive 
functions (i.e. DCCS task) and social deficits, once the effect of theory of mind was 
considered. 
Several factors may have contributed to the null findings in Study 1. One 
explanation may be the poor internal consistency of the DCCS inhibitory control 
measure (a=.43). Another plausible explanation was the complexity of the change-
in-location task. Accordingly, an artificial response medium was designed to 
distance children from their intent to point (Hala & Russel，2001), thus reducing the 
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inhibitory demands of the task. Nevertheless, a majority of children in Study 1 found 
it difficult to comprehend the use of an artificial response medium; often children 
became confused between pointing and using the color-card as the mode of 
responding. To this end, the complexity level of the follow-up Study 2 was reduced. 
The two inhibitory levels of change-in-location task were retained with only one 
variation, which was that children were asked to point to the target box in response 
to false belief questions. In other words, the only manipulation of inhibitory 
demands in the change-in-location task was whether children could actually see the 
target object (i.e., opaque boxes vs. "window" boxes). 
A final speculation concerns the selection of theory of mind task. Multiple 
tests of theory of mind were introduced in Study 2 because the use of an aggregate 
approach has been shown to produce a more reliable measure of theory of mind 
abilities (Hughes et a l , 2000). In addition to change-in-location task, an unexpected 
content task and an appearance-reality task were selected to assess children's false 
belief understanding. 
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CHAPTER III: STUDY 2 
The first aim of this follow-up study was to link false belief understanding to 
a broader domain of social functioning. This was achieved by employing i) the 
Social Skills Rating Systems for Parents (SSRS-P, Gresham & Elliott, 1990) and ii) 
observational coding (Dunn et al, 2000; Gottman, 1983) to address both pro-social 
and problematic social behaviors in children. To assess theory of mind, a battery of 
false belief tests, including the change-in-location task (Wimmer & Pemer，1983)， 
the appearance-reality task (Flavell et al., 1983)，and the unexpected-content task 
(Pemer et al., 1987; Gopnik & Astington，1988)，was administered. 
The second aim of Study 2 was to examine further the relationships between i) 
inhibitory control and theory of mind; and ii) inhibitory control and social 
functioning. In this follow-up study, the DCCS direct test of inhibitory control was 
not employed due to poor internal consistency observed in previous study. The 
effects of inhibitory control on theory of mind and social deficits were examined 
through modified inhibitory manipulations of the change-in-location task (Hala & 
Russell, 2001). 
Finally, non-verbal intelligence and general language abilities were also 
tested as control variables. These were measured by Raven's Colored Progressive 
Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998) and the Reynell Developmental Language 
Scales (RDLS; Reynell & Huntley，1985) respectively. 
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 110 five-to six-year-old children (range = 5;1 to 6;7，M = 5; 8, SD 
=4.6 months, 59 boys and 51 girls) were recruited from 9 local kindergartens in 
Hong Kong, China. Children came from predominantly middle class families. 
Approximately 18 % of the children's fathers were employed in the labor/manual 
sector, 60 % were in the general sector，and 13 % were in the professional sector. 63 
% of the parents had an educational attainment below tertiary level. Cantonese was 
the predominant language at home. No physical or psychological abnormalities were 
reported by kindergarten teachers. Informed consents were obtained from the parents 
of participants. 
Materials 
Four cardboard boxes (two in silver and two in gold) measuring l lx 11 x 
11cm were used in the change-in-location scenarios. For two of the cardboard boxes, 
transparent windows were cut into their front faces and were covered in Perspex. 
Four animal puppets and props were used to enact the story vignettes. 
In the appearance-reality task, two animal puppets and two objects with 
deceptive contents were used. One was a magnet that resembled a peanut; the other 
was an eraser that looked like a Lego cube. 
In the unexpected-content task, materials included two animal puppets and 
two familiar containers with unexpected contents. One was a Band-Aid box 
containing elastics while the other was a milk carton containing Q-tips. 
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Measures 
Non-verbal Intelligence 
Subset A of the Raven's Colored Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & 
Court, 1998) was used to assess children's nonverbal intelligence. The maximum 
possible score was 12. 
General Language Ability 
Reynell Developmental Language Scales (RDLS; Reynell & Huntley, 
1985) served as the measure of general language ability. The test was adopted and 
translated into Cantonese. The possible total score is 67. 
Theory of Mind Battery 
Change-in-Location Task. The change-in-location scenarios (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983) were identical to those in the previous study; the task was divided into 
two experimental conditions (Hala & Russell, 2001): i) High-inhibitory-demand 
condition. The design and procedure was identical to that in Study 1. "Windows" 
boxes were used so that children could see the insides of the boxes, ii) Modified low-
inhibitory-demand condition. The procedure differed from the earlier study only in 
respect that children were required to point to the target boxes. Opaque boxes, rather 
than 'windows' boxes were employed in low-inhibitory-demand condition. 
The two experimental conditions were administered in counterbalanced 
order. For each change-in-location scenario, the story was repeated to the child if 
he/she failed either of the control questions; testing was discontinued when a child 
failed either of the control questions for three consecutive trials. Test trials have been 
reduced from four to one trial for each condition; false belief score ranges from 0-2, 
yielding a possible score of 0-2 for each condition. Cronbach's alphas for the low-
Social behavior 41 
inhibitory-change-in-location measures and high-inhibitory-change-in-location 
measures were .36 and .51 respectively. 
Appearance-Reality Task. In the following procedures developed by 
Flavell et al. (1983), two objects with misleading appearances were shown to 
children. One was a magnet that resembled a peanut; the other was an eraser that 
resembled a Lego cube. For each trial, children were first shown the object and were 
asked "What is it?" Next, the experimenter revealed the true identity of the object to 
the children. They were asked about their own false belief, "When you first look at it, 
what did you think it is?" and the belief of a naive puppet, "Here comes X. He/she 
has never seen this object. What does X think it is?" followed by a reality control 
question, "What is it really?" Credits were granted only if the child passed the reality 
control question. One point was given if the child answered the belief question 
correctly. The total possible appearance-reality score was 0-4. Cronbach's alpha for 
the measure was .73. 
Unexpected-Content Task. A standard unexpected-content task was 
administered (Pemer et al., 1987; Gopnik & Astington，1988). Children were 
presented with two familiar containers with unusual contents inside. One was a 
Band-Aid box containing elastics while the other was a milk carton containing Q-tips. 
I* 
After it was revealed what was actually inside the container, children were asked 
about their own false belief, "When you first saw this box, what did you think was 
inside?" and the belief of a naive puppet, "Here comes X. He/she has never looked 
inside the box. What does X think is inside?" followed by a control question, "What 
was really inside the box?" Credits were granted only when children correctly 
answered the control question. Two trials of each belief question yielded a possible 
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score of 0-2, for a total possible unexpected-content score across the four test 
questions of 0-4. Cronbach's alpha for the measure was .76. 
Social Functioning 
Parents ‘ Ratings. Children's social behaviors were assessed using a 49-item 
Social Skills Rating System for Parents, Chinese version (SSRS-P, Gresham & 
Elliott, 1990). The preschool version of the SSRS was presented in two subscales: 
the Social Skills subscale and the Problem Behaviors subscale. The Social Skills 
subscale contained four dimensions: Cooperation, Assertion, Responsibility, and 
Self-Control. Satisfactory internal consistencies were reported with coefficient alpha 
of .77 for Cooperation; .74 for Assertion; .65 for Responsibility and .80 for Self 
control. The Problem Behaviors subscale contained two dimensions: Externalizing 
and Internalizing Problems. Coefficient alphas reported were .75 and .71 for the 
Externalizing and Internalizing Problems respectively. All items were rated 
according to a 3-point scale (i.e., "never", "sometimes" and "very often".) A 
summary of reliability analyses for the present study is shown in Table 3b. 
Observational measures of peer interaction. Following Gottman's (1983) 
procedure, a single 30-minute videotaped observation of children playing together 
was conducted during the second visit. Children were randomly assigned in groups 
of four and were filmed playing together alone in a room, with a set of toys provided. 
Peer interactions were rated using modified categories of Dunn (Dunn et al, 2000; 
Magurie & Dunn，1997) and Gottman (Gottman, 1983, Gottman & Parker，1986; 
Kramer & Gottman，1992). Children's interactive behaviors were coded as duration 
events, using the Observer Video-Pro (Version 4.0). Behaviors were coded based on 
the following categories: 
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a) Cooperative pretend play, coded when a child was involved in a 
joint pretend game, role or plan, or when the child followed a 
pretend suggestion of others. 
b) Coordinated play, coded when a child agreed with another's 
suggestion, or attempted to cooperate in a joint activity. 
c) Amity, coded when a child expressed affection; joined in singing or 
smiling; or shared excitement or deviance with others. 
d) Control and Dominance, coded when a child prohibited actions of 
other children, threatened others, refused to compromise, or 
expressed anger and frustration when the child's demands were 
rejected. 
e) Conflict, coded when a child was involved in an object struggle, 
aggressive acts or other behaviors that threatened the harmony 
among peers. 
f) Rejection, coded when a child was rejected by others. 
g) Withdrawal, coded when a child was involved in solitary play, 
passive observation, or unoccupied. 
h) Pro-social behaviors, coded for pro-social acts such as comforting, 
helping other, sharing or highlighting feelings. 
i) Bids for attention, coded when a child made a bid for attention or 
response to which another child failed to respond. 
A summary of reliability analyses is shown in Table 3b. 
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Procedures 
Each child was tested in two 45-minute visits with an interval of about one 
week. During the first visit, non-verbal intelligence test, general language test and 
battery of theory of mind tasks were administered in randomized order. During the 
second visit, children who had been tested in the first visit were randomly assigned to 
a group of four in the videotaped play session. Following Gottman and Parkhurst 
(1980，1983) procedure, a portable videotape recorder and a set of toys were placed 
in a playroom. There was a 15-minute warm-up session in which the experimenter 
initiated joint activities and games among the children. Next, children were asked to 
play together in the room. Children's interactions were videotaped for a 30-minute 
period. To reduce the intrusive effect of others' presence, no adult other than the 
experimenter was present during play sessions. The experimenter would not 
intervene during conflicts among children unless it became absolutely necessary to 
do so, such as when children were physically disruptive or getting into the 
equipments. Videotaped observations were transcribed and coded by employing 
Observer Video-Pro (Version 4.0). Children's interactions were rated using modified 
categories of Dunn (Dunn et al, 2000; Magurie & Dunn, 1997) and Gottman 
(Gottman, 1983, Gottman & Parker, 1986; Kramer & Gottman，1992). Two 
observers were involved in observational coding. 
Social behavior 45 
Results 
Shown in Table 3a are the descriptive statistics for the measures of non-verbal 
intelligence, general language ability, theory of mind and inhibitory functions. Table 
3b displays the reliability analyses for all test measures. Table 3c displays the 
correlations among test variables. Observational variables were created to reflect the 
total proportion of coded behavior over a 30-minute recording period; reliability 
analysis revealed a 77.5 % of inter-rater agreement. 
Table 3a. Means, Standard Deviations and Ranges for Test Scores (n = 110) 
‘ Max M SD Range 
Nonverbal intelligence 12 7.54 2.13 1-11 
General language ability 67 54.84 6.70 1-64 
Theory of mind battery 
Change-in-location task 
Low-inhibitory-demand condition 2 1.45 .68 0-2 
High-inhibitory-demand condition 2 1.4 .72 0-2 
Appearance-reality task 4 3.18 1.20 0-4 
Unexpected-Content task 4 2.52 1.47 0-4 
SSRS Social Skills subscale 
Cooperation 20 11.99 3.13 5-20 
Assertion 20 12.18 3.05 5-19 
Responsibility 20 12.66 2.83 7-20 
Self-Control 20 12.87 2.79 6-19 
SSRS Problem behavior subscale 
Externalizing problems 12 4.63 1.66 0-9 
Internalizing problems 8 1.66 1.46 0-6 
Videotaped Observation- positive peer 
interaction 
Cooperative pretend play 100 4.91 9.28 0-43.30 
Coordinated play 100 58.38 25.11 .8-99.50 
Amity 100 2.42 3.66 0-16.30 
Pro-social behaviors 蘭 .23 .58 0-3.80 
Videotaped Observation- negative peer 
interaction 
Conflict 100 2.43 2.57 0-9.90 
Control and Dominance 100 1.59 6.07 0-61.20 
Withdrawal 100 21.37 19.80 0-92 
Rejection 100 .02 .07 0-.07 
Bids for attention • -38 1.76 0-17.20 
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Table 3b. Reliability Analysis for Test Measures (n = 110) 
a 
Theory of mind battery 
Change-in-location task 
Low-inhibitory-demand condition .36 
High-inhibitory-demand condition .51 
Appearance-reality task .74 
Unexpected-Content task -76 
Theory of mind aggregate .84 
SSRS Social Skills subscale 
Cooperation .61 
Assertion .72 
Responsibility .64 
Self-Control .72 
SSRS Problem behavior subscale 
Externalizing problems 56 
Internalizing problems .62 
inter-rater agreement (%) 
Videotaped Observation- positive peer interaction 
Cooperative pretend play .93 
Coordinated play .们 
Amity .65 
Pro-social behaviors 
Videotaped Observation- negative peer interaction 
Conflict "9 
Control and Dominance 
Withdrawal -77 
Rejection .92 
Bids for attention 
So
ci
al
 b
eh
av
io
r 
47
 
T
ab
le
 3
c.
 C
or
re
la
tio
ns
 b
et
we
en
 M
ea
su
re
s 
(n
 =
 1
10
) 
* 
p<
 0
5 
**
 p
<.
00
1 
° S
SR
Sp
ar
en
ts 
‘ r
at
in
g 
* 
O
bs
er
va
tio
na
l 
co
di
ng
 
1-
 
2.
 
3.
 
4.
 
5.
 
6.
 
7.
 
8.
 
9.
 
10
. 
11
. 
12
. 
13
. 
14
. 
15
. 
丨
 6
. 
17
. 
18
. 
19
. 
20
. 
1.
 
A
ge
 
-
2.
 
G
en
de
r 
-.0
4 
-
3.
 
In
co
m
e 
-.0
3 
.0
9 
-
4.
 
N
on
-v
er
ba
J 
in
te
lli
ge
nc
e 
.2
3*
 
-.0
5 
.1
1 
-
5.
 
G
en
er
al
 la
ng
ua
ge
 a
bi
lit
ie
s 
.1
2 
-.1
1 
.0
2 
AO
**
 
-
6.
 
Th
eo
ry
 o
f m
in
d 
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
.2
1*
 
-.0
6 
.2
3*
 
.0
1 
.0
6 
-
7.
 
A
ss
er
tio
n'
 
.07
 
-.2
6*
* 
.2
0*
 
.3
7*
* 
.2
1*
 
.07
 
-
8.
 
Co
op
er
at
ion
' 
.11
 
-.0
5 
.10
 
.11
 
.12
 
.03
 
. 5
2*
* 
-
9.
 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
' 
.0
4 
.0
6 
.1
8 
.0
4 
.1
7 
.0
3 
.1
1 
.2
3*
 
-
10
. 
Se
lfc
on
tr
or
 
.10
 
.05
 
.02
 
.06
 
.10
 
25
* 
.3
3*
* 
.5
4*
* 
.12
 
-
11
. 
Ex
te
rn
al
iz
in
g 
pr
ob
le
m
s'
 
-.0
4 
-.0
2 
-.1
6 
-.1
3 
-.1
8 
-.2
4*
 
-.0
6 
-.2
5*
 
.1
1 
-.3
4*
* 
-
12
. 
In
te
rn
al
iz
in
g 
pr
ob
le
m
s"
 
.1
4 
.1
8 
-.2
0*
 
-.1
3 
-.0
2 
-.0
4 
-.4
0*
* 
-.2
2*
 
.0
1 
-.1
4 
.3
3*
* 
-
13
. 
Pr
o-
so
ci
al
 b
eh
av
io
rs
 b
 
.1
9*
 
-.0
7 
-.0
2 
.0
9 
.0
7 
-.0
9 
.0
0 
.0
8 
-.1
8 
-.0
4 
-.0
9 
.0
2 
-
14
. 
A
m
ity
" 
-.0
3 
.0
0 
.0
9 
.0
9 
.0
8 
.0
5 
.1
4 
.0
7 
-.0
6 
.0
0 
-.1
9 
-.0
6 
-.0
6 
-
15
. 
C
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e 
pr
et
en
d 
pl
ay
" 
.2
3*
 
.0
0 
.3
6*
* 
.1
3 
.1
6 
.0
8 
-.0
3 
.1
2 
.1
2 
.0
8 
-.1
4 
-.0
3 
.1
5 
.1
4 
-
16
. 
C
oo
rd
in
at
ed
 p
la
y"
 
-.1
2 
.0
7 
.1
3 
-.1
0 
-.0
5 
.1
3 
.2
2*
 
.0
3 
-.1
1 
.0
6 
.1
3 
-.0
6 
.0
8 
-.1
5 
-.2
7*
* 
17
. 
B
id
s 
fo
r 
at
te
nt
io
n'
' 
.0
3 
-.1
2 
. 0
0 
.1
3 
-.0
1 
-.1
5 
.1
1 
-.0
5 
-.0
2 
-.0
6 
-.0
4 
-.0
6 
.1
0 
-.0
6 
-.0
6 
-.1
9 
-
18
. 
W
ith
dr
aw
al
" 
.0
4 
-.0
8 
-.2
7*
* 
-.0
5 
.0
1 
-.1
6 
-.2
7*
* 
-.0
5 
.0
8 
-.0
1 
-.0
2 
.0
9 
-.1
7 
-.0
6 
-.1
3 
-.7
8*
* 
.2
5*
* 
-
19
. 
R
ej
ec
te
d 
by
 p
ee
rs
" 
-.0
3 
.1
7 
-.1
3 
.0
8 
.0
5 
-.2
3*
 
-.1
9 
-.0
9 
-.1
0 
-.0
5 
-.0
2 
.0
9 
-.0
8 
-.0
4 
-.0
8 
-.2
9*
* 
-.0
2 
39
**
 
-
20
. 
C
on
fli
ct
" 
-.0
4 
-.2
3*
 
-.1
4 
.2
1*
 
.0
4 
-.3
5*
* 
.1
7 
.0
1 
-.0
6 
-.1
7 
.1
7 
-.0
5 
.0
3 
-.0
4 
.2
5*
 
.0
5 
.1
1 
-.0
2 
.1
1 
-
21
. 
C
on
tr
ol
 a
nd
 d
om
in
an
ce
" 
.0
5 
.0
3 
-.0
6 
-.0
1 
.0
3 
-.0
6 
.0
1 
-.0
6 
-.0
1 
-.0
5 
-.0
2 
.0
5 
-.0
6 
.0
8 
-.0
9 
.0
3 
-.0
2 
.0
2 
-.0
2 
.1
5 
Social behavior 48 
Examining Hypothesis 1: The Relationship between Inhibitory Control and Theory 
of Mind 
As is consistent with Study 1, executive manipulations did not affect children's 
performance on theory of mind tasks. As presented in Table 5, Low-IC-change-in-
location performance and High-IC-change-in-location performance were strongly 
correlated, r (103) = .14, p< .001. Paired sample t-test has also shown no notable 
difference between the two measures, t (107) = 1.14,p = .26. 
Examining hypotheses 2 & 3: Comparing the Explanatory Powers of Theory of Mind 
and Inhibitory Control with respect to Social Functioning 
Although both change-in-location measures were significantly correlated with 
scores in i) SSRS Self-control, ii) SSRS Externalizing problems, iii) Observational 
Rejection by peers and iv) Observational conflict, no significant difference was 
found between these relationships, /-test values for the comparisons are as follows: 
i) SSRS Self-control: t (95) = .67，p >.05. 
(Ho： Fxy = fxz.； where x is SSRS Self-control; y is the low-IC-change-in-location score, 
and z is high-IC-change-in-location score) 
ii) SSRS Externalizing problems: t (97) = .68，p >.05. 
(Ho： rxy = r^. where x is SSRS Externalization problems; y is the low-IC-change-in-
location score, and z is high-IC-change-in-location score) 
Hi) Observational Rejection by peers: t (107) = -.23, p >.05 
(Ho： Fxy = fxz,； where x is Observational Rejection by peers; y is the low-IC-change-in-
location score, and z is high-IC-change-in-location score) 
iv) Observational Conflict: / (107) =-8.78, >.05. 
(Ho： Fxy = r^ z,； where x is Observational conflict; y is the low-IC-change-in-location 
score, and z is high-IC-change-in-location score) 
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As Inhibitory manipulations have not been shown to affect children's 
performance in change-in-location task, in the analyses that follows, a theory of mind 
aggregate score was used by combining the scores of the two sets of change-in-
location task, the appearance-reality tasks and the unexpected content task. 
Cronbach's alpha for the theory of mind aggregate was .84. 
Preliminary analysis revealed that among the eight pro-social behavioral 
measures, theory of mind ability was positively associated with the SSRS Self-
control score, r (90) = .25’p < .05. Multiple regression analyses were further 
conducted to examine this association. First, age, gender and family income were 
entered into the first block. Second, non-verbal intelligence and Reynell general 
language variables were entered. Finally, theory of mind aggregate was entered into 
the model. Table 4 displays the regression coefficients and the increments in variance 
explained at each step for each model. On top of the control variables, the theory of 
mind ability explained an additional 5 % of the variance in the SSRS Self-Control 
score, F (1,78) = 4.04,/7<.05. 
Among the seven measures of social deficits, theory of mind has been shown to 
be negatively correlated with SSRS Externalizing problems, r (92) = -.24,/? < .05; 
Observational Rejection of peers score, r (101) = -.23，/? < .05; and Observational 
conflict score, r (101) = -35,p < .001. Multiple regression models were again 
conducted to determine the total amount of variance in social problems that was 
accounted for by theory of mind performance. Control variables were entered in the 
same manner as in last regression analyses; summary of multiple regression analyses 
is presented in Table 4. Independent of age, family income, non-verbal intelligence 
and general language ability, theory of mind score explained a 5% unique variance in 
the SSRS externalizing problem score, F (1，79) = 424,p< .05. Similarly, 5 % of 
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additional variance in the observational rejection of peers score was accounted for by 
the theory of mind measures, F (1，85) = 4.80,/? < .05. Finally, theory of measures 
explained an additional 11% of variance for the observational Conflict score, F (1，85) 
=12.82，;7<.001. 
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Table 4. Summary of Multiple Regression Analyses Assessing Contributions of Theory of 
Mind to Social Functioning 
SSRS Self-Control ^ AR^ 
Step 1 
Age .09 .03 .03 
Gender .09 
Family income .11 
Step 2 
Non-verbal intelligence .03 .03 .00 
General language ability -.14 
Step 3 
Theory o f mind .22 .07 .05* 
SSRS Externalizing problems ^ AR^ 
Step 1 
A g e -.03 .04 .04 
Gender -.18 
Family income -.15 
Step 2 
Non-verbal intelligence -.05 .06 .02 
General language ability -.05 
Step 3 
Theory o f mind -.13 .10 .05* 
Observational Rejection by peers score ^ A R^ 
Step 1 
Age -.07 .06 .06 
Gender .03 
Family income -.07 
Step 2 .02 
Non-verbal intelligence -.04 .08 
General language ability .03 
Step 3 
Theory o f mind -.06 .13 .05* 
Observational Conflict score ^ R^ A R^ 
Step 1 
A g e -.03 .09 .09* 
Gender -.01 
Family income -.02 
Step 2 
Non-verbal intelligence .27 .15 .05 
General language ability .07 
Step 3 
Theory o f mind -30 .26 .11** 
*p<.05 **p<.001 
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Discussion 
The results lend further support for the theory of mind hypothesis. In line with 
the results in Study 1，false belief understanding, as measured by the change-in-
location task, the appearance-reality task, and the unexpected-content task, was 
significantly associated with three of the problematic social skill measures. In 
particular, children's theory of mind ability was inversely related to i) SSRS 
Externalizing problems score, ii) observational Rejection by peers score; and iii) 
observational Conflict score. 
One of the objectives of the follow-up Study 2 was to determine the extent to 
which theory of mind ability could further explain positive social interaction. It was 
found that, as expected, children's performance on false-belief tasks positively was 
related to their SSRS Self-control among the eight pro-social behavioral measures. 
However, it is noteworthy that in the present study theory of mind seems to have 
more explanatory power for problematic social behaviors than for positive social 
skills. I am not suggesting theory of mind ability is unrelated to pro-social behaviors. 
Rather, it is more likely that experimental false belief paradigm, such as the change-
in-location tasks, unexpected-content tasks and appearance reality tasks, may be 
more specific in tapping the problematic aspect in the domains of social interactions. 
It may be the case that the incorporation of other theory of mind tasks, such as 
emotion-understanding tasks, may provide a more comprehensive picture of the 
relationship between theory of mind and social competence. I will return to this point 
in the General Discussion. 
Another objective of the study was to further investigate the effects of 
inhibitory control on theory of mind performance and social functioning. Consistent 
with the findings in Study 1，there was no support for the executive dysfunction 
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hypothesis. Although the complexity level of the experimental change-in-location 
paradigm was reduced, manipulations of inhibitory functions again did not notably 
affect children's performance on theory of mind tasks; performance in the two 
conditions did not differ significantly from each other. Moreover, the current study 
failed to relate inhibitory control to social functioning. In examining the associations 
between inhibitory manipulations and social functioning, no significant group 
difference was observed between children's performances on change-in-location 
tasks with respect to social performance. A follow-up Study 3 was thus designed to 
provide an alternate approach for further investigation in two ways: 
First, inhibitory manipulations were replaced by an aggregate measure of 
inhibitory control processes in the hope that it might provide a more reliable measure 
for tapping children's inhibitory control. The inhibitory battery included: a Day-
Night task (Hong & Diamond, 1994)，a Bear-Dragon task (Kochanska et al., 1996; 
Reed, Pien & Rothbart, 1984)，a DCCS task (Frye et al., 1995) and a Stroop-like task 
(Michael, Christopher & Esther，2002). 
Second, a younger sample was selected to examine potential age extension of 
the relationship between children's inhibitory control and theory of mind. A number 
of studies have demonstrated that inhibitory control and theory of mind shared a 
common time table，at around the age of 4 years. (Reed et al., 1984; Gerstadt et a., 
1994; Dochanska et al., 1996 & Zelozo et al., 1996). As my previous investigations 
targeted only on 5- to 7-year-old kindergarteners, it remained an open question as to 
whether and how inhibitory control might affect the theory of mind development in 
younger children. Given the developmental synchrony of the theory of mind and 
inhibitory functions, I reasoned that the relations between the two cognitive abilities 
would be more pronounced at around the age of 4. Specifically, it was posited that in 
Social behavior 54 
follow-up Study 3, 3 to 4-year-olds，inhibitory control would be significantly related 
to their mastery of theory of mind task. 
A further advantage of the selection of a young sample was that it opened a 
way to replicate the findings in Study 1 in relating theory of mind ability to social 
deficits. If the theory of mind hypothesis is correct, then impairments in theory of 
mind would remain to correlate with social deficits in a younger sample of 3-to-4-
year-olds, as assessed by the Child Behavioral Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach, 1991; 
Achenbach & Rescorla, 2000). 
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CHAPTER IV: STUDY 3 
This follow-up study was undertaken to further investigate the relationships 
among inhibitory control, theory of mind and social functioning in younger children 
with ages ranging from 3 to 4 years. To assess children's inhibitory functions, 
multiple tests of inhibitory control were administered, which included a Day-Night 
task (Hong & Diamond，1994), a Bear-Dragon task (Kochanska et al, 1996; Reed, 
Pien & Rothbart, 1984), a DCCS task (Frye et al, 1995) and a Stroop-like task 
(Michael, Christopher & Esther, 2002). 
To assess theory of mind competence, an array of false-belief tasks were 
selected, these included a change-in-location task (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983), an 
appearance-reality task (Flavell et al, 1983) and an unexpected-content task (Pemer 
et al., 1987; Gopnik & Astington, 1988). As manipulations of inhibitory functions 
did not notably affect children's performance on change-in-location task in my 
previous two studies, in the follow-up study the two levels change-in-location tasks 
were replaced by a standard change-in-location task (i.e., no inhibitory manipulations 
were performed.) 
Moreover, the Social Withdrawal and Aggression subscales of Child 
Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach, 1991; Achenbach & Rescorla, 2000) were 
used to address children's problem behaviors. 
Finally, control variable non-verbal intelligence was assessed with the 
Raven's Colored Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Gourt，1998). 
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Method 
Participants 
The participants were 71 three to four-year-old children (range = 2;9 to 4;3， 
M = 4;1, SD = 2.5 months, 29 boys and 34 girls) recruited from five kindergartens in 
Hong Kong, China. Children came from predominantly lower to middle class 
families. Approximately 44 % of the children's fathers were employed in the 
labor/manual sector; 45 % were employed in the general sector; and 3 % were 
employed in the professional sector. 73 % of the parents had an educational 
attainment below tertiary level. Children were all native Cantonese speakers. 
Informed consents and socio-economic data were obtained from the parents of 
participants; each parent was assured that all information would be kept anonymous 
and confidential. No child had been previously assessed or diagnosed as having any 
psychological or physical abnormalities as reported by kindergarten teachers. 
Materials 
For the False belief battery, a) two cardboard boxes (one in silver and the 
other in gold) measuring 1 Ix 11 x 11cm were used in the change-in-location 
scenarios. Four animal puppets and props were used to enact the story vignettes, b) 
In the appearance-reality task, two animal puppets and two objects with deceptive 
contents were used. One was a magnet that resembled a peanut; the other was an 
eraser that resembled a Lego cube, c) In the unexpected-content task, materials 
included two animal puppets and two familiar containers with unexpected contents. 
One was a Band-Aid box containing elastics while the other was a milk carton 
containing Q-tips. 
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For the inhibitory control battery, a) four sets of cards measuring 8 x 8 cm were 
used in the DCCS card sorting task. Each set consists of 2 target cards with target 
pictures and 6 test cards with pictures on different dimensions. In all conditions the 
target cards were affixed to their target box measuring 11x11x11cm. The test cards 
were to be placed into one of these boxes, b) In Day-Night task, two target cards 
measuring 8 x 8 cm were used. One was a black card showing a moon; the other was 
a white card showing a sun. c) Two animal puppets were used in the Dragon-Bear 
task, d) Finally, in the Stroop-like task, three sets of cards measuring 8 x 8 cm were 
used. Each set consists of 2 target cards. In low-inhibition condition and medium-
inhibition conditions, the two target pictures differ in one dimension, e.g., color. In 
high-inhibition condition, the two targets differ in two dimensions, e.g., color and 
size. 
Measures 
Non-Verbal Intelligence 
Subset A of Raven's Colored Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court， 
1998) was employed to measure individual differences in nonverbal intelligence. The 
maximum possible score was 12. 
General Language Ability 
The Reynell Developmental Language Scales (RDLS; Reynell & Huntley, 
1985) served as the measure of general language ability. The test was adopted and 
translated into Cantonese. The possible total score was 67. 
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False Belief Battery 
Three standard false belief tasks, the change-in-location task, the appearance 
reality task, and the unexpected content task were administered to each child. 
Standard Change-in-Location Task. Two trials of standard change-in-
location false belief task were administered (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). The 
procedure was identical to that in Study 1 and Study 2 with the exception that only 
opaque cardboard boxes were used in the change-in-location scenarios. For each 
scenario, the story was repeated to the child if he/she failed either of the control 
questions; testing was discontinued when a child failed either of the control questions 
for three consecutive trials. False belief score ranges from 0-2, yielding a possible 
score of 0-2. Cronbach's alpha for the measure was .72. 
Appearance-Reality False Belief Task. The design and procedure of the 
appearance-reality task (Flavell et al., 1983) was identical to that of Study 2. Two 
trials of each test questions yielded a total possible score of 0-4. Cronbach's alpha for 
the four test questions was .72. 
Unexpected-Content False Belief Task. The unexpected-content task (Pemer 
et al., 1987; Gopnik & Astington, 1988) used the same format as that in Study 2. 
Two trials of each belief questions yielded a possible score of 0-2, for a total possible 
unexpected-content score across the four test questions of 0-4. Cronbach's alpha for 
the four test questions was .67. 
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Inhibitory Control Battery 
An inhibitory control battery, consisting of a DCCS card sorting task, a Day-
night task, a Bear-Dragon task and a modified Stroop-like task was administered in 
randomized order. 
DCCS card sorting task. The design and procedure of the Dimensional 
Change Card Sorting Task (DCCS; Frye et al., 1995) was identical to that of Study 1. 
One of the following dimensional shift conditions was employed for each child in 
randomized order: i) a color-shape and size-number condition and ii) a color-size and 
number-shape condition. One point was given for each correct post-switch trial, 
yielding a possible total score of 0-5. Cronbach's alpha for the ten test items was .97， 
indicating high internal consistency. 
Day-Night task. Based on Gerstadt, Hong and Diamond (1994), children were 
first shown a black card showing a moon and a white card showing a sun. The 
experimenter then explained, "Now we are going to play a game. When you see this 
card with the sun on it, I want you to say 'night'; when you see this card with the 
moon on it, I want you to say 'day'. A verbal rule check and two practice trials then 
followed, feedback was given by experimenter if necessary. Five test trials were then 
administered without feedback and in a random order. Each correct response was 
awarded one point, for a total possible score of 0-5. Cronbach's alpha for the 
measure was .64. 
Bear-Dragon Task. In the Bear-dragon task (Kochanska et al., 1996; Reed, Pien 
& Rothbart, 1984)，children were first asked to imitate ten self-directed actions. Next, 
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the experimenter introduced two puppets, X and Y. and children were given the 
following instructions: 'Now we are going to play a game. Here's 'nice X，，you 
always have to listen to what it says; and here's 'naughty Y’，do not follow it's 
commands'. Five trials of practice trials then followed and feedback was given if 
necessary. This was followed by 10 test trials (5 X trails and 5 Y trials in randomized 
order) with no feedback. Scoring of inhibitory control was as follows: 0 = fully 
complied response, 1 = a partial complied response, 2 = a wrong movement, 3 = no 
response. Children received possible total scores ranging from 0-15. Cronbach's 
alpha for the four test questions was .86. 
Stroop-like task. The Stroop-like task was a modified version of the stroop-like 
paradigm of Michael, Christopher and Esther (2002). The task was divided into three 
inhibitory-demands levels. In all levels participants were asked to selectively call out 
the names of targets but not of others. In a low-inhibition condition, two pictures 
were presented to the child (e.g., a blue bus and a red bus) and the child was 
instructed to call out the name of target picture (e.g., ‘red bus') but not the other. In 
this condition the name always reflect the property of the target. In the medium-
inhibition condition, one dimension of the target name was in conflict with the target. 
For instance, children were shown a target card, a red apple, and another card with a 
green apple on it. In this condition children were instructed to call out the name 
'green apple，whenever they saw the target. In high-inhibition condition, two 
dimensions of the target name were in conflict with itself. For instance, children were 
shown a target card, a big yellow bird, and another card with a small red bird on it. 
The target would be named 'small red bird'. One point was given for each correct 
response. Five trials of each condition yielded a possible score of 0-5, for a total 
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possible across the three conditions of 0-15. Cronbach's alphas were .84 for the low-
inhibition condition-, .80 for the medium-inhibition condition and .84 for the high-
inhibition condition. 
Social Functioning 
Chinese version of the Social Withdrawn and Aggressive Behavior subscales 
of the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach，1991; Achenbach & Rescorla， 
2000) were completed by teachers of participants to assess children's problematic 
social behaviors. The social withdrawal subscale consisted of 10 behavioral 
descriptions, which included items such as 'unresponsive to affection'. The 
aggression subscales consisted of 25 aggressive behavior descriptions, which 
included items such as 'destroys others' things'. Teachers were asked to assess 
children's behavioral frequencies using 3-point rating scale ranging from ’not true' to 
‘often true'. The maximum total scores were 20 and 50 for the withdrawal and 
aggression subscales respectively. Cronbach's alphas were .83 for the Aggressive 
subscale and .72 for the Withdrawal subscale respectively. 
Procedures 
Children were individually tested in a quiet room within a 45-minute period. 
In some occasion, testing was administered on two different sessions, about 1 week 
apart. Test batteries were administered in randomized order by trained psychology 
undergraduates. Children whose first language was not Cantonese or who were 
uncomfortable during testing were excluded from the study. Children were given 
stickers as souvenirs upon completion of testing. 
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Results 
The descriptive statistics for the raw scores are displayed in Table 5a. Table 5b 
displays the reliability analyses for all test measure. Table 5c displays the 
correlations among individual level variables. 
Table 5a. Descriptive Statistics (n = 71) 
Max M SD Range 
Individual level 
Non-verbal intelligence 12 4.20 2.41 0-9 
Theory of mind 
Change-in-location 4 1.03 1.22 0-4 
Appearance-reality 4 1.51 1.42 0-4 
Unexpected-content 4 .71 1.17 0-4 
Inhibitory control 
Dragon-Bear 15 8.31 6.05 0-15 
DCCS 5 2.97 2.34 0-5 
Day-Night 5 4.07 1.21 0-5 
Stroop-like paradigm 
Low-inhibition condition 5 4.27 1.38 0-5 
Medium-inhibition condition 5 3.93 1.57 0-5 
High-inhibition condition 5 2.13 1.92 0-5 
CBCL problematic behavior 
Aggressive behavior 50 2.41 3.44 0-17 
Withdrawal behavior 20 2.33 2.48 0-8 
Class level 
Class size 11 5.92 3.32 1-11 
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Table 5b. Reliability Analyses of Test Measures (n = 71) 
g 
Theory of mind 
Change-in-location .72 
Appearance-reality .72 
Unexpected-content .67 
Inhibitory control 
Dragon-Bear .86 
DCCS .64 
Day-Night .97 
Stroop-Iike paradigm 
Low-inhibition condition .84 
Medium-inhibition condition .80 
High-inhibition condition .84 
CBCL problematic behavior 
Aggressive behavior .83 
Withdrawal behavior .72 
Table 5c. Correlations between measures (n = 71) 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. age -
2. Gender -.09 -
3. Income .10 -.06 -
4. Nonverbal intelligence .19 .17 ,16 -
5. Theory of mind .05 .04 .19 .10 -
6. Inhibitory control .19 .10 .39** .38** .39** -
7. Aggressive behavior .10 -.21 .10 -.13 -.09 -.14 -
8. Withdrawal behavior .00 -.04 .23 -.09 -.14 .04 .48** -
*p<.05 **p<.001 
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Examining Hypothesis I: the Relationship between Inhibitory control and Theory of 
Mind 
In contrast with previous findings of Study 1 and 2, children's inhibitory control 
was found to be significantly related to their theory of mind performance, r (70) 
=.39, /7<.001. The aggregate measure of inhibitory control as a more reliable 
measure might contribute to the positive findings of the present study. It was also 
possible that such significant findings were a result of the use of a much younger 
sample, i.e., 3- to 4-year olds. I will return to this point in Discussion. 
Examining hypotheses 2 & 3: Comparing the Explanatory Powers of Theory of Mind 
and Inhibitory Control with respect to Social Functioning 
Inspections of the correlations indicate that neither theory of mind {r (31) = -.09, 
p = .62)，and inhibitory control (r (31) = -.14,/? = .44) was significantly associated 
with CBCL Aggressive symptoms. Similarly, no significant relationships were 
observed between CBCL Withdrawn symptoms and theory of mind (r (32) = -A4,p 
=.43) or inhibitory control (r (32) = .04, p = .83) 
Nevertheless, due to the nested nature of the data set structure, Hierarchical 
Linear modeling (HLM) was used to account for the potential clustering effect of 
individual variables within class-level. As in Study 1, a two-level model was tested. 
Each of these levels is further expanded upon below. 
Associations between CBCL problematic behavior and student-level variables 
are represented in the level-1 model: 
Y i j = P o j + P i j . . … + pQj + rij 
where 
poj is the intercept ; 
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Pij - Bqj are the coefficients for each of the individual-level variable; 
ry is error term. 
Level-2 model captures the influence of class-level variables. 
Intercept: 
Poj = Yoo + uoj 
Slopes:(3ij = yio + uij 
Poj = YQO + UQj 
where 
Goo is the grand mean behavioral symptoms of all classes; 
uoj is the deviation of the mean behavioral symptoms of class j from the 
grand mean behavioral symptoms when class-level variables were controlled. 
The relationships among theory of mind, inhibitory control and social 
functioning were investigated separately for each CBCL subscale. 
For CBCL aggressive subscale, the association between inhibitory control 
and CBCL aggressive behaviors was estimated first, the model is represented as 
follows: 
Level-1 model: 
(CBCL aggressive behavior)ij = Poj + Pij (gender) + Pij (age) + p3j (family 
income) + p4j (non-verbal intelligence) +p5j 
(inhibitory control) + ry 
Level-2 model: 
Poj = Yoo + Uoj； Pij = Yio + Uij； P2j = 720 + U2j； P3j = Y30 + U3j； 04�=丫40 + U4j 
P5j = Y50 + U5j 
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Estimated fixed and random effects are presented in Table 6a. As indicated, 
no significant relationship was found between CBCL aggressive behavior and 
inhibitory control, p =-1.15, / (11) =-1.19, j!? = .26. 
In the next step of the analytic plan, theory of mind ability was introduced 
into a separate model to examine the linkage between CBCL aggressive behavior 
and theory of mind measures. 
Level-1 model: 
(CBCL aggressive behavior) ij = Poj + Pij (gender) + p2j (age) + Psj (family 
income) + P4j (non-verbal intelligence) +p5j 
(theory of mind) + ry 
Level-2 model: 
Poj = YOO + Uoj； P i j = y io + Uij； Pzj = yiO + U2j; p3j = Y30 + Usj； P4j = Y40 + U4j 
p5j = Y50 + U5j 
The results in Table 6b indicated no significant association between theory of 
mind and CBCL aggressive behavior, P = -.63,/(11) = -2.00,p = .07. 
Finally, a full model that allowed an estimation of relationships between 
inhibitory control, theory of mind and CBCL aggressive behavior was fitted. 
Level-1 model: 
(CBCL aggressive behavior) ij = Poj + Pij (gender) + p2j (age) + Psj (family 
income) + p4j (non-verbal intelligence) +P5j 
(theory of mind) + Pej (inhibitory control) +rij 
Level-2 model: 
P o j = YOO + Uoj； P i j = Y l O + Uij； Pzj = 720 + U2j； P3j = Y30 + U3j； P4j = 740 + U4j 
P 5 j = Y50 + U5j； p6j = Y60 + U6j 
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Shown in Table 6c are the estimated fixed and random effects of the model. 
When both theory of mind abilities and inhibitory control were both entered in the 
model, theory of mind was found to be a significant predictor of CBCL aggressive 
behavior, P = -.61, / (11) = -2.44, p <.05, the negative associations between the two 
measures significantly varied across classes, X^ (2) = 8.46,/? <.05. This might 
suggest a suppression effect; in particular, theory of mind, which was of little use as 
a predictor of aggressive behavior, became important when it was combined with 
inhibitory control. No significant relationship was found between inhibitory control 
and CBCL aggressive behavior, p = -.04, /(11) = -.36,p = .72. 
Social behavior 68 
Table 6 b. HLM model for CBCL aggressive behavior 
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t-ratio 
overall mean (Yoo) 5.69 2.15 2.65* 
Gender (Yo,) 0.66 1.53 0.43 
Age(Yo2) -.19 0.22 -.83 
Family income C/o3) 2.12 2.51 0.85 
Non-verba丨 intelligence (Yo4) -.34 0.60 --57 
Inhibitory control (Yo5) 0.96 -1.19 
Random variance Coefficient SD X^ 
Intercept (uoo) 5 M 36.46** 
Gender (Uo丨） 12.08 3.48 4.55 
Age (Uo2) 0.22 0.47 6.56* 
Family income (Uo3) 35.39 5.95 55.85** 
Non-verbal intelligence (Uo4) 1.96 1.40 0.35 
Inhibitory control (Uo5) 5.20 2.28 519.54** 
*p<.05 **p<.001 
(CBCL aggressive behavior) ij = Poj+ p,j (gender) + pzj (age) + p3j (family income) + p4j (IQ) +P5j(inhibitory 
control) + fij 
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Table 6 b. HLM model for CBCL aggressive behavior 
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t-ratio 
overall mean (Yoo) 4.70 2.08 2.25* 
Gender (Yo.) -3.72 3.58 -1.04 
Age (丫02) 0.38 0.18 2.05 
Family income (703) 0.18 0.67 0.27 
Non-verbal intelligence (Y04) -.21 0.54 -.38 
Theory of mind (Y05) --63 0.31 -2.00 
Random variance Coefficient SD X^ 
Intercept (uoo) 21.66 28.44**~~ 
Gender (uo,) 69.77 8.35 80.79** 
Age (U02) 0.11 0.34 8.87 
Family income (Uo3) 2.07 1.44 2.43 
Non-verbal intelligence (Uo4) 1.65 1.28 54.12** 
Theory of mind (Uo5) 0.47 0.68 17.50** 
*p<.05 **p<.00} 
(CBCL aggressive behavior) ij = poj+ Pij (gender) + pzj (age) + Paj(family income) + (IQ) +P5j(Theory of 
m i n d ) + rij 
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Table 6 b. HLM model for CBCL aggressive behavior 
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t-ratio 
overall mean (Yoo) ^ U 9 1 1 3 * ~ 
Gender (Yo丨） -3.03 2.93 -1.03 
Age(Yo2) .13 .17 .77 
Family income (Yo3) .80 .95 .83 
Non-verbal intelligence (Yo4) -.19 .14 -1.35 
Theory of mind (Yos) --61 .25 -2.44* 
Inhibitory control Cyo6) -.04 .11 -0.36 
Random variance Coefficient SD X^ 
Intercept (uoo) ^ 632* 
Gender (uq,) 48.10 6.94 17.57** 
Age (Uo2) .07 .27 6.92* 
Family income (Uo3) 4.64 2.15 3.25 
Non-verbal intelligence (Uo4) .03 .17 5.71 
Theory of mind (Uo5) .31 .55 8.46* 
Inhibitory control (u 06) .05 .22 3.03 
*p<‘05 **p<.001 
(CBCL aggressive behavior) ij = (3oj+ Pij (gender) + p2j (age) + Paj (family income) + (34j (IQ) +p5j 
( theory o f mind) + p6j (inhibitory control) + ry 
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For the CBCL withdrawal subscale, inhibitory control was first introduced to the 
model to explain CBCL withdrawal behavior. 
Level-1 model: 
(CBCL withdrawal behavior)ij = Poj + Pij (gender) + P2j (age) + psj (family 
income) + P4j (non verbal intelligence) +p5j 
- (Inhibitory control) + ry 
Level-2 model: 
Poj = Yoo + UOj; Plj = Yio + Uij； p2j = Y20 + U2j； P3j = 730 + U3j； p4j = 丫 4 0 + U4j 
P5j = Y50 + U5j 
As shown in Table 7a, the relation between inhibitory functions and CBCL 
withdrawal symptoms was not significant, p = -.06，/(II) = -1.55,/? = .15. 
A model that allowed an estimation of the theory of mind abilities on withdrawal 
behavior was next fitted. 
Level-1 model: 
(CBCL withdrawal behavior)ij = Poj + Pij (gender) + Pij (age) + Paj (family 
income) + p4j (non-verbal intelligence) +P5j 
(theory of mind) + ry 
Level-2 model: 
Poj = Yoo + Uoj； P l j = YlO + U,j； P2j = Y20 + U2j; Psj = 730 + U3j; P4j = 740 + U4j 
P5j = Y50 + U5j 
The results in Table 7b reveals a significantly negative relationship between 
theory of mind ability and children's withdrawal behavior, p =-.12, ^ (11) = -3.63，p 
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<.05. The effects of theory of mind on withdrawal behavior was found to vary across 
classes, X^ (2) = 5.94,/? = .05. 
Finally, a full model was then attempted in which both theory of mind abilities 
and inhibitory control were added to the model. 
Level-1 model: 
(CBCL withdrawal behavior) ij = poj + Pij (gender) + P2j (age) + p3j (family 
income) + p4j (non-verbal intelligence) +P5j 
(theory of mind) + P6j (inhibitory control) 
+ru 
Level-2 model: 
Poj = Yoo + UOj; P l j = YlO + Uij； P2j = Y20 + U2j； P3j = 730 + U3j； p4j = 丫 4 0 + U4j; 
P5j = Y50 + U5j; P6j = Y60 + U6j 
When both predictors were introduced in the model (Table 7c), theory of 
mind remained to be a significant predictor of CBCL withdrawal behavior, p = -.24, 
r (11) = -8.86,/? <.001. A potential suppression was found in the relationship 
between inhibitory control and CBCL withdrawal behavior; the addition of the 
predictor theory of mind in the model significantly improved the explanatory power 
of inhibitory control, p = .06, t (11) =3.67,/? <.05. 
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Table 6 b. HLM model for CBCL aggressive behavior 
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t-ratio 
overall mean (Yoo) L59 .12 2.20* 
Gender (yo,) -.29 .98 -.30 
Age (Y02) .25 -20 1.23 
Family income (703) .21 .64 .33 
Non-verbal intelligence (Yo4) -.10 .23 -.45 
Inhibitory control (yo5) -.06 .04 -1.56 
Random variance Coefficient SD X^ 
Intercept (UQO) 1 5 3 L59 4 7 , 0 1 * * ~ 
Gender (UQ,) 4.90 2.21 57.20** 
Age (U02) .23 .48 99.80** 
Family income (Uo3) 2.02 1.42 242.30** 
Non-verbal intelligence (U04) .25 .20 60.85** 
Inhibitory control (uqs) .01 .08 27.109** 
*p<.05 **p<.001 ‘ 
(CBCL withdrawal behavior) ij = poj+ Pij (gender) + p2j (age) + Pjj (family income) + p4j (IQ) +P5j(Inhibitory 
control) + r,j 
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Table 6 b. HLM model for CBCL aggressive behavior 
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t-ratio 
overall mean (yoo) 4.42 .69 2.05 
Gender (yo.) -.10 1-20 -.08 
A g e (yo2) .31 .18 1-71 
Family income (丫03) .25 .58 -43 
Non-verbal intelligence (YO4) -.17 .19 -別 
Theory of mind (Yo5) ..12 .03 3.64* 
Random variance Coefficient SD X^ 
Intercept (uoo) ^35 4 0 . 5 0 * * ~ 
Gender (uo,) 7.47 2.73 71.83** 
Age (U02) .19 .43 74.87** 
Family income (Uo3) 1.67 1.29 42.61** 
Non-verbal intelligence (Uo4) .18 .43 53.21** 
Theory of mind (Uo5) .00 .06 5.94* 
*p<.05 **p<.001 
( C B C L withdrawal behavior) ij = poj+ Pij (gender) + p2j (age) + pjj (family income) + P4j (IQ) +p5j(Theory of 
mind) + fy 
Social behavior 75 
Table 6 b. HLM model for CBCL aggressive behavior 
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t-ratio 
overall mean (Yoo) -13 .79 .16 
Gender (Yoi) -.49 1.06 -.47 
Age (yo2) .18 .15 1.19 
Family income (YO3) .89 .96 .93 
Non-verbal intelligence (Yw) -.43 .24 -1.79 
Theory of mind (Yo5) -.24 .03 -8.86** 
Inhibitory control (Yoe) .06 .01 3.66* 
Random variance Coefficient SD X^ 
Intercept (uoo) ^43 i J l 139 .73**~ 
Gender (uo,) 5.82 2.41 121.72** 
Age (U02) .12 .35 127.28** 
Family income (u�3) 4.55 2.13 147.93** 
Non-verbal intelligence (U04) .29 .54 109.21** 
Theory of mind (UQS) .00 .05 2.02 
Inhibitory control (u 06) .00 .03 2.95 
*p<.05 **p<.001 “ 
(CBCL withrawal behavior) ij = Poj+ p,j (gender) + P2j (age) + Paj (family income) + p4j (IQ) +P5j 
(theory of mind) + Pej (inhibitory control) + ry 
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Discussion 
One of the objectives of Study 3 was to replicate the findings in Study 1, in 
which deficits of theory of mind was related to children's deviant social behavior. As 
was the case with Study 1，children's theory of mind ability was found to be 
negatively related to their CBCL withdrawal behavior. Furthermore, the present 
study also showed a link between theory of mind and CBCL aggressive behavior, 
such relationship, however, was suppressed by the effect of inhibitory control. 
The other objective of Study 3 was to further examine the explanatory power of 
inhibitory control with respect to children's theory of mind performance. In contrast 
to the previous two studies, the present study has shown that theory of mind ability 
was significantly related to the components of inhibitory control. There are two 
plausible explanations for such findings. First, it may be the case that an aggregate 
approach provided a more reliable and appropriate measure assessing children's 
inhibitory control. Second, the relations between inhibitory control and theory of 
mind may be especially pronounced in early stages of children development. This 
speculation is fed by finding of Hughes's (1998) and Charman et al. (2001), which 
has shown a stronger association between impairments in theory of mind and 
inhibitory control in younger age groups. I will return to this point in General 
Discussion. 
The final objective of this study was to link inhibitory control to children's 
social behavior. A potential suppression was found in the association between 
inhibitory control and theory of mind; the addition of the predictor theory of mind in 
the model significantly improved the explanatory power of inhibitory control, which 
by itself was of little use as a predictor of CBCL withdrawal symptoms. 
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that in Hierarchical Linear modeling, the sample 
size of 71 children did not provide sufficient statistical power to reliably detect 
correlations between the variables of interest. Given this limitation, future empirical 
investigation with much larger samples would be an important step in the 
understanding of children's social development. 
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CHAPTER V: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present study extends previous work on social competence by focusing on 
the relationships of theory of mind ability and executive functions to each other, and 
to social interaction skills in a sample of typically developing three to six-year-old 
children. Taken together, the main findings was that 
i. Theory of mind was inversely associated with a range of behavioral 
social deficits and was positively related to self-control behavior; such 
associations held when inhibitory control and other control variables 
were considered. 
ii. The attempt to link children's inhibitory functioning and their theory 
of mind performance have by far produced mixed results, only one of 
the presented three studies have shown a significant relation between 
the two measures. 
iii. Limited explanatory power of inhibitory control was found for 
children's social behavior. Inhibitory factors failed to explain unique 
variance in the domain of social functioning when shared effect of 
theory of mind was controlled. 
Our data argue for meta-representational theory of mind (ToM) playing a 
substantial role in children's social functioning. In this sense, the current study 
supports the theory of mind hypothesis that social interaction deficits were directly 
attributable to domain-specific impairments in the ability to impute mental states to 
self and others, and were independent of general inhibitory components. In the 
following sessions I begin by canvassing some of the principle findings of the 
present studies, I then consider potential directions for future research and suggest 
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basis from which to develop and implement screening tools and interventions for 
children with or at risk of social difficulties. 
The first hypothesis of the present study was that inhibitory control would be 
positively related to theory of mind performance. In the current study I attempt to 
establish the linkage by employing direct assessment and experimental manipulations 
of inhibitory functions. Nevertheless, findings from the present three studies indicate 
weak associations between inhibitory control and theory of mind: I first examined 
the effects of inhibitory manipulations of the change-in-location task on 4-to-6 year-
olds' performance in Study 1 and Study 2. Such efforts have produced conflicting 
results with past research linking inhibitory control to theory of mind (Call & 
Tomasello, 1999; Carlson and Moses, 2001; Carlson et al.，2002; Frye et al., 1995); 
manipulations of inhibitory demands failed to significantly affect children's 
performance on change-in-location task. I then I extended my investigations in Study 
3，using an aggregate direct measure of inhibitory control and a younger sample of 3-
to-4-year-olds. Findings revealed a significant relationship between children's 
inhibitory control and theory of mind performance, suggesting that an aggregate 
approach may be a more reliable and powerful measure in the study of inhibitory 
control. It is also plausible that the association between inhibitory control and 
theory of mind may be especially pronounced in earlier stages of cognitive 
development. As noted in the discussion session, findings from the studies of Hughes 
et al. (1988) and Charmann et al. (2001) have shown executive dysfunction, 
especially inhibitory control, emerged at a very young age around fours years in 
hard-to-manage children; and was associated with impairments in the development 
of social understanding. For older children, only executive deficits remained but no 
theory of mind impairments was observed. Thus, the effects of inhibitory control on 
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theory of mind are likely to be manifest very early in children's development, at 
around the age of 4 years. However, my data do not provide a definite empirical 
basis for ascribing such speculation; further cross-sectional or longitudinal studies 
with larger sample sizes are needed to substantiate this claim. 
There was no support for the second hypothesis that impairments in executive 
functioning may account for social deficits (Damasio & Maurer, 1978; Russell, 
1997). Existing data suggest that measures of inhibitory control do not have much 
explanatory power for children's social behavior across the three studies. Even when 
executive control did contributed to the explained variance of social behavior; its 
contributions did not held once theory of mind was considered. Future research 
direction to be considered would be associating general executive functions with 
social performance. For example, Fahie and Symon (2003) investigated the 
relationships among theory of mind, attentional flexibility, working memory, and 
inhibitory control in clinically referred children with attention and behavioral 
problems. Results indicated children with social deficits had poorer theory of 
performance and overall executive functions. Executive functions aggregate and 
social problems remained to be significantly related to one another after theory of 
mind was considered. It is therefore worth considering whether the various 
components of executive functioning have distinct or overlapping associations with 
children's social performance. 
In support of the third hypothesis, children's theory of mind performance, as 
assessed by false-belief measures, were positively related to their social functioning. 
Across the three presented studies, theory of mind ability was found to be negatively 
related to a range of social and behavioral deficits in three- to six-year-old 
kindergarteners. Children with theory of mind impairments were more likely to 
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exhibit a) aggressive and b) withdrawal behaviors, and c) externalizing problems. 
They were also more likely to be d) in conflict with others and e) to be rejected by 
peers. Furthermore, the present study provides further empirical support for the 
theory of mind hypothesis that children's theory of mind task has unique 
contributions in explaining their social performance, above and beyond general 
inhibitory control. Domain-specific deficits in false belief understanding underpin 
children's' social interaction impairments. From a pedagogical point of view, the 
findings here indicate important implications in designing and implementing 
interventions for children with or at risk of social difficulties. Given the importance 
of false belief understanding in social functioning, interventions should essentially 
adopt the explicit teaching of meta-representations through the incorporation of 
'mind reading' tasks into the educational curriculum. 
Study 2 sought to extend the investigations by linking theory of mind to positive 
social behaviors. Only one out of the eight assessed pro-social behaviors, Self-
control, was found to be significantly related to theory of mind. It seems that 
experimentally assessed false belief understanding is centrally relevant to the 
development of fundamental social skills. In this sense, the ability to represent and 
impute mental states, and the awareness of oneself and others may be regarded as the 
milestone in the development of appropriate social behaviors. Impaired or delayed 
false belief understanding may be expected to hinder the development of the basic 
yet crucial interaction skills for harmonious everyday social encounters. Thus, a child 
with difficulties in false belief understanding is more likely to manifest social deficits, 
such as initiating and sustaining conversations, showing responsiveness and 
sensitivity to the social context and to others, being able to maintain positive contact 
and counter play rejections. Nevertheless, it seems that basic mind conception, 
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assessed by tests such as false belief task, are not sufficient for competent social 
functioning, manifested by pro-social behaviors such as sharing, expressing feeling, 
affirming others, collaboration, and sharing. Competent social functioning may 
impose additional demands on other developmentally advanced social-cognitive 
skills, other than false belief understanding. This interpretation is tentative but 
suggests potential directions for continued empirical investigation. Broader 
investigations in the various components of the theory of mind construct, such as 
emotional recognition and awareness, or linguistic aspect of representational mind 
understanding, may be useful in elucidating the relationships between theory of mind 
and social development. 
Conclusion 
This study teased apart the relations between basic, domain-general inhibitory 
skills, and domain-specific meta-representational theory of mind abilities in the 
social functioning of young children. Findings indicate the domain-specific inability 
to impute mental states to self and others uniquely contributes to social interaction 
deficits, independently of general inhibitory components. Further empirical 
investigation of the potential correlates of social functioning, which requires a much 
larger sample and wider ranges of theory of mind and executive functions 
assessments, would no doubt shed light on the understanding of children's social 
cognitive development. 
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